This paper develops a simple duopoly model in which investments in R&D and patents are inputs in the production of firm rents. Patents are necessary to appropriate the returns to the firm's own R&D, but patents also create potential claims against the rents of rival firms. Analysis of the model reveals a general necessary condition for the existence of a positive correlation between the firm's R&D intensity and the number of patents it obtains. When that condition is violated, changes in exogenous parameters that induce an increase in firms' patenting can also induce a decline in R&D intensity. Such a negative relationship is more likely when (1) there is sufficient overlap in firms' technologies so that each firm's inventions are likely to infringe the patents of another firm, (2) firms are sufficiently R&D intensive, and (3) patents are cheap relative to both the cost of R&D and the value of final output.
This paper presents a simple model that explores the relationship between the incentive to invent and the incentive to obtain patents. Unlike much of the previous literature, we do not treat these as a single decision. Instead we explore the factors required for investments in R&D and patents to be complementary in the manner typically assumed in most theoretical models and policy discussions.
We derive sufficient conditions for patents and R&D to be substitute inputs in the production of firm profits: (1) there must be sufficient overlap between the firms' patented inventions, (2) firms must be sufficiently R&D intensive, and (3) patents are cheap relative to both the cost of R&D and the value of final output. The first requirement may be due to the nature of a technology, but it can also result from the manner in which patents are drafted and examined. The latter two depend both on the pecuniary costs of R&D and patents and the standards required for patentable inventions. In such environments, firms increase their patenting in order to tax the rents earned on a rival's inventions and to mitigate similar behavior by their rivals. Firms respond by reducing their R&D investments.
Section 1 presents the model. Section 2 presents the main results. Section 3 investigates welfare implications. Section 4 places the results in the context of U.S. patent policy and empirical research on the economic benefits of the patent system. All proofs are found in Hunt (2006).
The Model
A measure of consumers have a unit demand for the final output (inventions), which can be interpreted as improvements in product quality. There is a competitive fringe of firms that are able to imitate and produce inventions at no cost, but they have no independent R&D capability.
There are also two firms, sharing the same technology, that are capable of inventing and seeking property rights over their inventions. These two firms move simultaneously, deciding on the amount of R&D ( ) i x to perform and the number of patents ( ) i n to obtain. Both activities are subject to a constant marginal cost, R and C, respectively (final output is the numeraire). The required inputs are assumed to be purchased from competitive markets, so these prices also represent the social cost of performing R&D and obtaining patents.
An investment of i x in R&D leads to a measure of the final goods invented 1 ( ) ( ), n f x θ − that would otherwise be supplied by the competitive fringe. Firm 2 engages in the same activity, which extracts some rents from firm 1 and some output from the competitive fringe. The objective functions of the two firms are thus:
The parameter β is a parsimonious way of modeling the degree to which a firm's property rights depend on their inventions. When 0, β = each firm derives rents only from its own R&D investments. When 1 0, β > > a firm is able to lay claim to the inventions of others, but not as easily as it can claim inventions of its own making. Note that while the exact mechanism of the transfers is not specified in the model, holding R&D constant, the transfers impose no losses in the total potential rents that can be earned.
How should we interpret β ? For some industries it is a question of technology. Firms may draw from similar technical fields and arrive at similar solutions even when they apply them to different problems. This is particularly true for industries that advance through cumulative innovation and where firms may rely on a common set of building blocks derived from previous innovations. In addition, some products incorporate several, if not dozens, of potentially patentable innovations. Two examples of such an environment are semiconductors and computer software.
The size of β might also depend on the breadth of claims contained in patents.
1 If broad claims are regularly granted, it is more likely that firms will infringe each other's patents. Under this interpretation it is possible that patent breadth, and therefore β , can be influenced by policymakers or the courts.
A third, and more controversial, interpretation is that β is a measure of a firm's effectiveness in obtaining property rights over things it has not really invented. While this is explicitly prohibited by U.S. patent law, it might nevertheless arise from mistakes in the examination of patent applications. This is a topic that has received considerable attention in recent years (Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
Equilibrium and Comparative Static Results
The first order conditions for firm 1 are
where the subscripts refer to the variable for the appropriate firm. Note that in [1] the increase in revenue associated with additional R&D reflects the effect of firm 1's patenting and that of its rival, which the firm takes as given. In [2], the increase in revenue resulting from additional patenting includes the additional revenue firm 1 can extract from its rival.
The first order conditions imply the following relationship between R&D and patenting:
[3]
denote the relative cost of the inputs and
Thus when R&D is significantly more expensive than patenting, the firm will obtain more patents for every increment of R&D it performs. The wedge 1 τ is decreasing in the rival's R&D investments and patenting, and in β , but is increasing in the firm's own R&D. 
Welfare Analysis
What would a social planner do? It is easy to show that the amount of innovation in the private equilibrium is always less than the first best outcome. 2 In the first best solution, patents are unnecessary. In a second best world, and where R&D subsidies cannot be funded from an external source, the social planner may "tax" patenting to stimulate private R&D investments. It is easy to show the social planner will never permit the private cost of patents to be so low that the counter-intuitive outcome defined in Proposition 2 would occur. This follows from the first order condition of the planner's problem: Thus far we have treated the overlap parameter β as an exogenous aspect of the technological environment. Suppose the social planner has some control over the magnitude of β , perhaps through legal doctrines that determine the breadth of patent claims. Hunt (2006) shows that, if the output elasticity is not too small ( 1 2),
dx d β < In that case, the social planner would prefer less overlap and therefore more narrow patents. However, firms would respond to such a change by increasing their patent activity
Discussion
This paper develops a simple model that illustrates the relationship between firms' R&D and patenting decisions. It is typically the case that these two activities are complementaryfirms that do a lot of R&D also tend to patent more. And ordinarily, reducing the cost of R&D, or of patenting, will stimulate additional investments in R&D.
But as the model illustrates, this intuition does not always hold. Each firm cares about the patent strategies of its rival, which affects the rents it earns on its own discoveries, as well as the rents earned when the rival infringes its own patents. A necessary condition is a significant overlap between the rights granted to each firm (β must be at least ½). Then, if firms are sufficiently active in their R&D and patenting, incremental reductions in the cost of obtaining patents result in less, rather than more R&D. This does not imply the elimination of R&D investments, but rather less innovation than would otherwise occur.
Thus there may be instances where raising patent costs can actually induce more R&D.
This might be achieved via a patent tax or by increasing the requirements that must be satisfied in order to obtain a patent. For example, policymakers could increase the inventive step (the standard of nonobviousness in U.S. law) required to obtain a patent so that the most trivial advances over the prior art do not qualify for patent protection (Hunt 1999) .
The model suggests that the counter-intuitive outcome is more likely to occur in hightech industries that do a lot of R&D and patenting, and which tend to advance via cumulative innovation. 4 Previous empirical work has identified a number of industries with such characteristics, including electronics, computers, and semiconductors, and they account for most of the rapid growth in U.S. patenting in recent years (see Hall 2003 and references therein). They are also the industries where researchers identify what is sometimes called "strategic patent"
behavior, including the assembly of large portfolios for wholesale cross-licensing and possibly deceptive patent prosecution (Grindley and Teece 1997, Graham and Mowery 2004) .
modeled here in the context of patenting computer software. Obtaining such patents was difficult, but not impossible, during the 1970s and early 1980s. Over time, however, courts have become more receptive to such patents and their numbers have grown rapidly, primarily among firms in the industries described above. Bessen and Hunt (2003) find that, all else equal, firms that concentrated on obtaining software patents experienced a statistically and economically significant decline in their R&D intensity relative to other firms.
Of course, this is a highly stylized model that omits a number of important considerations from the analysis. For example, it is possible that the deleterious effects of excessive patenting can be mitigated through licensing arrangements or patent pools, assuming these can be negotiated without excessive transactions costs. 5 But it is not immediately obvious, in the context of "cheap" patents, that licensing arrangements improve innovation incentives. For example, Bessen (2003) shows that, when patent standards are low, firms are able to assemble large patent portfolios, which they use to make aggressive licensing demands. This encourages more patenting, but less R&D. Under higher standards, such a strategy is not cost effective. Figure 1 
